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Jedo the Jedi
Paragon in Training
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 3:38 am Post subject: 921 |
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Maybe you could reference the argument you already had elsewhere... _________________ Paragon Tally: 18 mafia, 3 SKs (1 twice), 1 cultist, numerous chat scum...and counting. |
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 3:51 am Post subject: 922 |
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| extro...* wrote: |
| jadesmar wrote: |
| extro...* wrote: |
| Should we make clear the sense we're meaning? |
I would like to know what your definition of this consciousness is, and why you believe that science can't measure it. |
Let's work together on it. First, I'm confident it's something you're quite familiar with. If we can get to the point where you say "Oh, that - I know exactly what your talking about", that will be a good start. But then I think you'll soon say it's rather difficult to define.
Let's start by you describing to me what the color yellow looks like to you. Further, suppose I'm an alien, with a different nervous system. I can see colors, and identify yellow. My nervous system is different, but as there is more than one way to skin a cat, there may well be more than one way to produce the same sensation of yellow. So tell me what yellow looks like to you, so I can know if you experience it the same way that I do. |
Ok, that sounds fun.
1. I know that there is something called yellow.
2. I know that things that are yellow either emit or reflect a range of wavelength(s) of light.
3. Of the things I think of that are yellow, all emit different wavelength(s) of light. (Bananas, Taxis and Lemons mostly)
4. Oh, rainbows, I can see yellow in a rainbow.
5. Why can I see yellow in a rainbow? I know that there is a continuous spectrum of light emitted by a rainbow, but for some reason, I see stripes of Red, Orange, Yellow, Green, Blue, Indigo and Violet.
5. The stripes are different widths. I see indigo as a really thin stripe for example.
6. School busses are yellow, some people call this colour orange. Is that their fault or mine? Is it a fault?
7. I think the easiest way then would be to explain that things that are yellow emit a range of wavelength(s) of light on average, this wavelength lies between orange and green. Then produce a list of things that are yellow, a list of orange and green things as well.
8. I'm curious as to how many different colours that alien would see in a spectrum of light.
9. What are those things that interior designers use to select paint? I think that there are swatches on that which would definitely be yellow, but also many things that might be green or might be orange. So, maybe we call those something else. This is the same as the school bus problem.
That probably a fair start. |
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 4:02 am Post subject: 923 |
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| Jedo the Jedi wrote: |
| Maybe you could reference the argument you already had elsewhere... |
Can we not? I like to read in the context of a conversation, but if I'm not a part of the conversation I really can't be bothered. There are way better things to read than old internet threads. |
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Jedo the Jedi
Paragon in Training
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 4:08 am Post subject: 924 |
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I just meant a link. You don't have to read it if you don't want. _________________ Paragon Tally: 18 mafia, 3 SKs (1 twice), 1 cultist, numerous chat scum...and counting. |
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 4:10 am Post subject: 925 |
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| Jedo the Jedi wrote: |
| I just meant a link. You don't have to read it if you don't want. |
Ok, as long as I can still continue my talk about yellow things. |
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extro...*
Guest
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 4:46 am Post subject: 926 |
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| jadesmar wrote: |
1. I know that there is something called yellow.
2. I know that things that are yellow either emit or reflect a range of wavelength(s) of light.
3. Of the things I think of that are yellow, all emit different wavelength(s) of light. (Bananas, Taxis and Lemons mostly)
4. Oh, rainbows, I can see yellow in a rainbow.
5. Why can I see yellow in a rainbow? I know that there is a continuous spectrum of light emitted by a rainbow, but for some reason, I see stripes of Red, Orange, Yellow, Green, Blue, Indigo and Violet.
5. The stripes are different widths. I see indigo as a really thin stripe for example.
6. School busses are yellow, some people call this colour orange. Is that their fault or mine? Is it a fault?
7. I think the easiest way then would be to explain that things that are yellow emit a range of wavelength(s) of light on average, this wavelength lies between orange and green. Then produce a list of things that are yellow, a list of orange and green things as well.
8. I'm curious as to how many different colours that alien would see in a spectrum of light.
9. What are those things that interior designers use to select paint? I think that there are swatches on that which would definitely be yellow, but also many things that might be green or might be orange. So, maybe we call those something else. This is the same as the school bus problem.
That probably a fair start. |
<--- that smiley looks yellow to you? But there is no yellow light coming from your monitor. The light emitted from that smiley on your screen is a combination of close to pure red and close to pure green. No yellow light at all. Humans are tri-chromats. They have receptors for red, green and blue. I'm a tetra-chromat (normal for my species), with receptors for red, green, blue and yellow, and just as red looks like no combination of blue and green to you, yellow looks like no combination of red, green or blue to me. Your "color space" is three dimensional. Mine is four dimensional. The colors you see can be naturally arranged into a three dimensional cube so that colors that look similar to you are close to each other in the cube - the more similar, the closer they are in that 3 D cube. Like this:
The colors I see require four dimensions to arrange them in such a way (so that similar looking colors are closer than dissimilar).
So, the combination of red and green light looks, to you, just like yellow light looks to you. You can't tell the difference. You call them both "yellow". Those two look completely different to me. What I call them doesn't matter (ፘጯጇጷ and ጬፙ፷ቋ, for the curious), but they're entirely different. Is the way that either of them look to me like the way yellow looks to you? From everything you've written, I've still no idea what yellow looks like to you. Describe it so that I can know whether it looks like ፘጯጇጷ, or like ጬፙ፷ቋ, or like neither of those. |
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 5:00 am Post subject: 927 |
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| extro...* wrote: |
I'm a tetra-chromat (normal for my species), with receptors for red, green, blue and yellow, and just as red looks like no combination of blue and green to you, yellow looks like no combination of red, green or blue to me.
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Oh, it's the name of the other receptor then. The yellow receptor.  |
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extro...*
Guest
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 5:39 am Post subject: 928 |
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OK, I'll take that as "the experience of yellow can't be described".
Similarly, we can't describe the difference between the experience of seeing a color, and the experience of hearing a tone. In everyday human existence, we know experience of colors usually correspond to light of certain wavelengths striking the retina, and we know that experience of sounds corresponds to compression waves of certain frequencies moving through air eventually moving tiny hair cells in the inner ear. But that tells us nothing about the subjective experiences, or the differences between them.
Our taste buds respond to only five kinds of taste. Can we describe them to an alien so he can know if salt tastes the same to us as it does to him? Perhaps salt tastes "sweet" to him. How to describe "sweet" and "salty", in a way that actually describes?
We could go on and on. Subjective experiences can't be described in a meaningful and actually descriptive, way. |
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 5:56 am Post subject: 929 |
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| extro...* wrote: |
OK, I'll take that as "the experience of yellow can't be described".
Similarly, we can't describe the difference between the experience of seeing a color, and the experience of hearing a tone. In everyday human existence, we know experience of colors usually correspond to light of certain wavelengths striking the retina, and we know that experience of sounds corresponds to compression waves of certain frequencies moving through air eventually moving tiny hair cells in the inner ear. But that tells us nothing about the subjective experiences, or the differences between them.
Our taste buds respond to only five kinds of taste. Can we describe them to an alien so he can know if salt tastes the same to us as it does to him? Perhaps salt tastes "sweet" to him. How to describe "sweet" and "salty", in a way that actually describes?
We could go on and on. Subjective experiences can't be described in a meaningful and actually descriptive, way. |
I'm not convinced. We know that the experience of yellow, salt or music fires receptors in the cortex. That is objective... why can't an isomorphic map can be produced between our minds and the aliens mind, then it would be trivial to transpose an experience.
That we don't know how to do that yet, might be considered a god-in-the-gaps argument. If not, why not? |
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Nsof
Daedalian Member
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 8:43 am Post subject: 930 |
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| BraveHat wrote: |
Actually, I'd like to rephrase that to make it less confusing:
1. The less our explanations depend on observations, the less grounds we have to think they are true.
2. A god's existence is not an observation.
Therefore, adding anything to an explanation that requires a god's existence gives us less grounds to think it's true
If any strong atheists agree with this argument, I can point out what's problematic about it. If not, then it's a straw man and there's no point in doing so. |
This rules out math/logic proofs since we do not rely on any observations to make them. I am not a strong atheist but I would phrase this a little differently:
1. The more ways to disprove something the more we trust it
2. There are zero ways to disprove gods existence but there is a way to prove gods existence.
This is more in line of scientific reasoning where any good theory should also provide the means to falsify itself (Karl Popper).
The two above might get someone to also become negative atheist and the reason they might choose positive atheism is:
3. If I do accept god then I also need to accept santa clause, unicons and Zag's invisible zoo. _________________ Will sell this place for beer |
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Jedo the Jedi
Paragon in Training
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 12:42 pm Post subject: 931 |
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| Nsof wrote: |
| 3. If I do accept god then I also need to accept santa clause, unicons and Zag's invisible zoo. |
I'm not sure about this. Well, maybe that is the atheists perspective, but almost no religion accepts Santa Claus, Unicorns, or the FSM (unless that is the religion). Just because a person accepts one "imaginary" being, doesn't mean they have to accept them all. _________________ Paragon Tally: 18 mafia, 3 SKs (1 twice), 1 cultist, numerous chat scum...and counting. |
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Nsof
Daedalian Member
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 1:02 pm Post subject: 932 |
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| Jedo the Jedi wrote: |
| Well, maybe that is the atheists perspective, but almost no religion accepts Santa Claus, Unicorns, or the FSM (unless that is the religion). Just because a person accepts one "imaginary" being, doesn't mean they have to accept them all. |
I am trying to describe an atheist's view.
From a critical standpoint, there are the same amount of evidence for FSM as there are for god - none.
From a scientific perspective if you accept one "imaginary" being you have to accept all of them. _________________ Will sell this place for beer |
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Jedo the Jedi
Paragon in Training
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 1:52 pm Post subject: 933 |
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Understood. _________________ Paragon Tally: 18 mafia, 3 SKs (1 twice), 1 cultist, numerous chat scum...and counting. |
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 2:24 pm Post subject: 934 |
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After a quick search, here are some peer-reviewed scientific research papers related to colour vision.
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Higher order color mechanisms: Evidence from noise-masking experiments in cone contrast space; Thorsten Hansen and Karl R. Gegenfurtner
J Vis January 23, 2013 13(1): 26; doi:10.1167/13.1.26
Systematic biases in adult color perception persist despite lifelong information sufficient to calibrate them; Aline Bompas, Georgie Powell, and Petroc Sumner
J Vis January 16, 2013 13(1): 19; doi:10.1167/13.1.19
Blobs versus bars: Psychophysical evidence supports two types of orientation response in human color vision; Mina Gheiratmand, Tim S. Meese, and Kathy T. Mullen
J Vis January 2, 2013 13(1): 2; doi:10.1167/13.1.2
Flashed stimulation produces strong simultaneous brightness and color contrast; Sae Kaneko and Ikuya Murakami
J Vis November 1, 2012 12(12): 1; doi:10.1167/12.12.1
Luminance contours can gate afterimage colors and "real" colors; Stuart Anstis, Mark Vergeer, and Rob Van Lier
J Vis September 6, 2012 12(10): 2; doi:10.1167/12.10.2
Color constancy investigated via partial hue-matching; Alexander D. Logvinenko and Anja Beer
J Vis April 30, 2012 12(4): 17; doi:10.1167/12.4.17
When viewing natural scenes, do abnormal colors impact on spatial or temporal parameters of eye movements?; Tien Ho-Phuoc, Nathalie Guyader, Frédéric Landragin, and Anne Guérin-Dugué
J Vis February 3, 2012 12(2): 4; doi:10.1167/12.2.4
Low-level motion analysis of color and luminance for perception of 2D and 3D motion; Satoshi Shioiri, Masanori Yoshizawa, Mistuharu Ogiya, Kazumichi Matsumiya, and Hirohisa Yaguchi
J Vis June 26, 2012 12(6): 33; doi:10.1167/12.6.33
Color names, color categories, and color-cued visual search: Sometimes, color perception is not categorical; Angela M. Brown, Delwin T. Lindsey, and Kevin M. Guckes
J Vis October 5, 2011 11(12): 2; doi:10.1167/11.12.2
Color selection, color capture, and afterimage filling-in; Jihyun Kim and Gregory Francis
J Vis March 30, 2011 11(3): 23; doi:10.1167/11.3.23
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So, at the very least, that is being studied scientifically. Which does kind of negate the claim that this can't be studied scientifically. |
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extro...*
Guest
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 3:30 pm Post subject: 935 |
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| jadesmar wrote: |
| So, at the very least, that is being studied scientifically. Which does kind of negate the claim that this can't be studied scientifically. |
I was taking a course on the physiology of color vision at Columbia University in 1975. I'm well aware it can be and is studied scientifically, and I've made that very clear numerous times, and never suggested otherwise. Not one of those papers, or any other, describes a subjective experience or attempts to explain how physiology produces a subjective experience of a particular nature. Again, there are two senses of what it means to "see", and I've made that clear. I can make a machine that "sees" colors. I don't suppose it has experiences as I have, but I can write a paper on how it "sees".
(at work now - will reply to other posts later) |
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 3:41 pm Post subject: 936 |
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| extro...* wrote: |
I was taking a course on the physiology of color vision at Columbia University in 1975. I'm well aware it can be and is studied scientifically, and I've made that very clear numerous times, and never suggested otherwise. Not one of those papers, or any other, describes a subjective experience or attempts to explain how physiology produces a subjective experience of a particular nature. Again, there are two senses of what it means to "see", and I've made that clear. I can make a machine that "sees" colors. I don't suppose it has experiences as I have, but I can write a paper on how it "sees".
(at work now - will reply to other posts later) |
Fair enough, I guess I'm not clear on the distinction that you are trying to draw. So, maybe we go back to yellow things.
If you had 4 color receptors instead of 3, would your experience of a rainbow be different? |
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extro...*
Guest
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 3:52 pm Post subject: 937 |
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| jadesmar wrote: |
| We know that the experience of yellow, salt or music fires receptors in the cortex. That is objective... why can't an isomorphic map can be produced between our minds and the aliens mind, then it would be trivial to transpose an experience. |
You need to explain that a little better.
| jadesmar wrote: |
| That we don't know how to do that yet, might be considered a god-in-the-gaps argument. If not, why not? |
It isn't a simple matter of not yet knowing how to do that, but of seeing that nature of one thing, and the nature of another, and understanding that there's a fundamental incompatibility.
I haven't the least doubt that we can explain why the alien says he's experiencing ፘጯጇጷ when certain lumps of matter are undertake configuration C1, and why he says he's experiencing ጬፙ፷ቋ when those same lumps of matter undertake configuration C2. But when he asks you "why does it look like ፘጯጇጷ?", you're stuck, because you can't get a clue what ፘጯጇጷ looks like, subjectively. Indeed, you don't know if he's really having any experiences at all, as you can understand the behavior he exhibits without presupposing that. |
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Jack_Ian
Big Endian
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 4:07 pm Post subject: 938 |
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Regarding the difference between experiencing sight and sensing some wavelength of light, here is an article where a guy tells of his experience of partially regaining his sight after 43 years of blindness.
It's quite fascinating. |
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Jedo the Jedi
Paragon in Training
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 9:18 pm Post subject: 939 |
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That is fascinating. I particularly liked that October 18 entry.
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| It is quite unsettling looking into someone's eyes, especially when you aren't used to it. When Ms DC to Denver casually leaned close enough, I couldn't even stammer out the answer that her eyes were blue. I might have been less shocked if she had taken her shirt off and asked what I could see...This was a very intimate experience and I can't fathom how sighted people go around seeing each other's eyes without being flustered too. |
_________________ Paragon Tally: 18 mafia, 3 SKs (1 twice), 1 cultist, numerous chat scum...and counting. |
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BraveHat
Last of the Daedalians
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Posted: Fri Jan 25, 2013 9:43 pm Post subject: 940 |
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| Nsof wrote: |
| BraveHat wrote: |
| 1. The less our explanations depend on observations, the less grounds we have to think they are true. |
This rules out math/logic proofs since we do not rely on any observations to make them. |
In math/logic, we define abstract concepts and intuit what their properties are. But I wonder if this kind of intuition is not a kind of observation itself. Could it not be argued that the associative property, for example, is a kind of intuitive observation of that which we have defined/created (numbers/arithmetic)? This is where we would have to get very specific about how we define "observations." I would define it as the receipt of input about that which exists. Abstract concepts exist as concepts. |
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BraveHat
Last of the Daedalians
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Posted: Sat Jan 26, 2013 3:37 pm Post subject: 941 |
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| Nsof wrote: |
1. The more ways to disprove something the more we trust it
2. There are zero ways to disprove gods existence but there is a way to prove gods existence.
This is more in line of scientific reasoning where any good theory should also provide the means to falsify itself (Karl Popper).
The two above might get someone to also become negative atheist and the reason they might choose positive atheism is:
3. If I do accept god then I also need to accept santa clause, unicons and Zag's invisible zoo. |
They haven't really upgraded their position with 3, unless they believe for some reason that "Zag's invisible zoo exists" is likely to be a false statement. If they do think that, why do they think that? My point, and extro's to some extent, is there's no actual correlation between non-falsifiability and likelihood of falsity. There might seem to be, but there really isn't. I add that the rejection of belief in Zag's invisible zoo is practical/utilitarian, rather than based on any kind of logos. |
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Nsof
Daedalian Member
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Posted: Sat Jan 26, 2013 10:33 pm Post subject: 942 |
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| BraveHat wrote: |
| They haven't really upgraded their position with 3, unless they believe for some reason that "Zag's invisible zoo exists" is likely to be a false statement. |
Right.
I promise this was my last attempt at proving god does not exist  _________________ Will sell this place for beer |
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Scurra
Daedalian Member
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 1:20 am Post subject: 943 |
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| Nsof wrote: |
I am trying to describe an atheist's view.
From a critical standpoint, there are the same amount of evidence for FSM as there are for god - none.
From a scientific perspective if you accept one "imaginary" being you have to accept all of them. |
I don't think either of those positions actually hold.
For the first, you have to assume that every single person who has any sort of belief in God (or even a god) is deluded and that the actions they have performed in the belief that they are serving said God are merely coincidentally good things that they might well have done anyway because of a universal moral code.
At present, I have several thousand years of evidence of people acting because they believed in God*, and zero years of evidence of people acting because they believed in the FSM.
Now it is certainly true that you may indeed chose to reject such evidence as not admissible due to being anecdotal, circumstantial, or not reproducible, or, indeed, that believers are all, in fact, deluded; I wouldn't contest your right to do so (except insofar as to suggest that delusion is in the eye of the beholder. ). All I know is that I am not unique in saying that this sort of evidence was a major contributory factor to my own faith.
*you may also argue that some people did their "good works" out of fear of Going to Hell. This may be true, but I think that's a theological argument and probably belongs elsewhere.
My issue with your second point is pretty much the same argument actually, quite apart from requiring an acceptance of the basic premise that God is an "imaginary being" (which I think requires a much more precise definition of both "imaginary" and "being".) And it's that I will draw my evidence for God from observation of human action (both good and bad.) I cannot do the same for unicorns - or even Santa Claus come to that, although he certainly has some darn fine evidence on his side! _________________
still Quiz Olympiad champion. Must get a life.
New definitions: COFFEE - someone who is coughed upon
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jadesmar
Bad Puppy
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 1:35 am Post subject: 944 |
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| Scurra wrote: |
| Nsof wrote: |
I am trying to describe an atheist's view.
From a critical standpoint, there are the same amount of evidence for FSM as there are for god - none.
From a scientific perspective if you accept one "imaginary" being you have to accept all of them. |
I don't think either of those positions actually hold.
For the first, you have to assume that every single person who has any sort of belief in God (or even a god) is deluded and that the actions they have performed in the belief that they are serving said God are merely coincidentally good things that they might well have done anyway because of a universal moral code.
At present, I have several thousand years of evidence of people acting because they believed in God*, and zero years of evidence of people acting because they believed in the FSM.
Now it is certainly true that you may indeed chose to reject such evidence as not admissible due to being anecdotal, circumstantial, or not reproducible, or, indeed, that believers are all, in fact, deluded; I wouldn't contest your right to do so (except insofar as to suggest that delusion is in the eye of the beholder. ). All I know is that I am not unique in saying that this sort of evidence was a major contributory factor to my own faith.
*you may also argue that some people did their "good works" out of fear of Going to Hell. This may be true, but I think that's a theological argument and probably belongs elsewhere.
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I think you are going to have to provide some evidence that the good actions performed in the name of a deity out number the bad actions performed in the name of the same.
Or, some evidence that the good actions performed in the name of God, out number the good actions done via a universal moral code.
Neither of these points are clear to me.
I also have several thousand years of people acting because of their belief in God to draw upon, and can think of countless anecdotal counter-examples to your argument.
There is no clear link in my mind between religion and moral actions. |
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Scurra
Daedalian Member
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 11:55 am Post subject: 945 |
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That's why I specifically said that you may choose to reject such evidence, because we're in very murky territory indeed, and where the arguments almost always end up as definitional ones.
In the first case, we'd have to start by defining the moral code by which you and I might separate "bad actions" from "good actions", before we even got into trying to decide whether someone doing an act "in the name of God" is the same as doing an act "for God". (Those of us who are Christians, for instance, have a pretty simple yardstick, defined in Matthew 25: 31-46, which is summarised as "whatever you did for one of the least of these, you did for me/ whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me." although again this is probably the wrong thread for that.)
In the second case, the main problem is that a universal moral code pretty much is the core component part of religion, which means that neither of us could adequately prove our position to the satisfaction of the other.. (Which is, of course, the worst sort of argument, when both sides are "right". ) _________________
still Quiz Olympiad champion. Must get a life.
New definitions: COFFEE - someone who is coughed upon
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novice
No harm. Pun intended!
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 12:17 pm Post subject: 946 |
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Extro, I would be interested to hear what it is you're getting at with your Socratean dialogue regarding colours and consciousness. You said we all would know what you were referring to, it's not clear to me yet. I think maybe you're saying there's some aspect of our consciousness that can only be explained by God?
If it's been covered already elsewhere, I'll accept a link.
Somewhat related to this discussion, I recommend the book The Righteous Mind - How Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion. |
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extro...*
Guest
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 2:10 pm Post subject: 947 |
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| novice wrote: |
| Extro, I would be interested to hear what it is you're getting at with your Socratean dialogue regarding colours and consciousness. You said we all would know what you were referring to, it's not clear to me yet. |
You haven't yet explained how yellow looks to you. For all I know, your experience of seeing yellow can be like my experience of hearing a 440Hz tone. Is there a way to describe either of those experiences so we can differentiate them?
| Quote: |
| I think maybe you're saying there's some aspect of our consciousness that can only be explained by God? |
Not at all. A god wouldn't help explain it any more than a flying spaghetti monster would. |
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novice
No harm. Pun intended!
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 4:12 pm Post subject: 948 |
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| extro...* wrote: |
| novice wrote: |
| Extro, I would be interested to hear what it is you're getting at with your Socratean dialogue regarding colours and consciousness. You said we all would know what you were referring to, it's not clear to me yet. |
You haven't yet explained how yellow looks to you. For all I know, your experience of seeing yellow can be like my experience of hearing a 440Hz tone. Is there a way to describe either of those experiences so we can differentiate them?
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I don't know, I don't think so?
I'm willing to stipulate whatever answer you want to this and any subsequent questions, in order to let you bring your argument to fruition. |
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extropalopakettle
No offense, but....
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 5:00 pm Post subject: 949 |
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| You can't describe what your experience of seeing a color is like. You can't describe the sensation of smelling a rose. How can you have a sensible theory that explains why neurons behaving a certain way produce a sensation like the smell of a rose, when you can't say a single thing to describe that sensation? A theory can't explain why some specific physical phenomena produces _______. What is _______? Something I can't describe, or tell you how to measure or detect. And you're going to have a sensible theory explaining it? Explaining WHAT? You can't even say. |
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extropalopakettle
No offense, but....
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 5:07 pm Post subject: 950 |
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| jadesmar wrote: |
| If you had 4 color receptors instead of 3, would your experience of a rainbow be different? |
Maybe, maybe not, but a rainbow might not be a good example to use in that question, as it is a 1-dimensional spectrum of light of a single wavelength at each point, while we see and discriminate between light consisting of combinations of multiple wavelengths. In the real world, light usually comes to us in combinations of wavelengths. We build computer monitors to deliver light in a combination of just 3 wavelengths, but real objects reflect multiple wavelengths. We have a 3 dimensional space of color experiences because we have 3 color receptors. We don't have a recptor tuned to light with a wavelength of around 580 nanometers (what we call yellow). If we did, the combination of red and green light (like this: ) would be distinguishable from yellow light (which isn't present here: ). Yellow light would be distinguishable from anything that can be displayed on your RGB computer monitor (unless these yellow receptors evolved without a purpose). We can't imagine what yellow light would look like to an organism that perceived it as a 4th primary color. Do you think we can explain why it looks that way to that organism? Looks what way? |
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novice
No harm. Pun intended!
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 6:47 pm Post subject: 951 |
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| extropalopakettle wrote: |
| You can't describe what your experience of seeing a color is like. You can't describe the sensation of smelling a rose. How can you have a sensible theory that explains why neurons behaving a certain way produce a sensation like the smell of a rose, when you can't say a single thing to describe that sensation? A theory can't explain why some specific physical phenomena produces _______. What is _______? Something I can't describe, or tell you how to measure or detect. And you're going to have a sensible theory explaining it? Explaining WHAT? You can't even say. |
I can't even say? I can't even tell what you're asking me to say.
Seeing a colour or smelling a rose stimulates neural pathways in my brain that trigger a sensation. This sensation is unique and has an internal label in my memories that enables me to recognize it as the sensation I get whenever I see yellow / smell a rose. Our language has the convention of labelling that colour sensation as yellow, which allows me to communicate with others about colours. Can I KNOW that the sensation I get when I see yellow is the same as others get when they see yellow? No I can't, but it seems reasonable to assume that the sensations are quite similar. Brain scans would reveal that the same parts of our brains are activated by the colour. Future technology might even enable us to communicate "telepathically", by imprinting my visual cortex's state in yours, allowing you to share the sensation I get when seeing the colour yellow.*
Like I said, our sensations and our consciousness are just emergent properties of our complex biochemistries.
*I doubt we'll ever be able to fully "decode" our brainwaves, though, since our brains aren't designed - they're a product of natural selection working on a series of happy accidents, so the neural and chemical interactions of the brain are bound to be multilayered and extremely complex. |
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Jedo the Jedi
Paragon in Training
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 7:21 pm Post subject: 952 |
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| novice wrote: |
| our brains aren't designed...so the neural and chemical interactions of the brain are bound to be multilayered and extremely complex. |
I'm pretty sure people who believe God created things would come to the same conclusion. _________________ Paragon Tally: 18 mafia, 3 SKs (1 twice), 1 cultist, numerous chat scum...and counting. |
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extropalopakettle
No offense, but....
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 8:36 pm Post subject: 953 |
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| novice wrote: |
| extropalopakettle wrote: |
| You can't describe what your experience of seeing a color is like. You can't describe the sensation of smelling a rose. How can you have a sensible theory that explains why neurons behaving a certain way produce a sensation like the smell of a rose, when you can't say a single thing to describe that sensation? A theory can't explain why some specific physical phenomena produces _______. What is _______? Something I can't describe, or tell you how to measure or detect. And you're going to have a sensible theory explaining it? Explaining WHAT? You can't even say. |
I can't even say? I can't even tell what you're asking me to say.  |
I'm NOT asking you to say, but if you're going to say there's a theory to explain IT, I think you need to be able to say what IT is. The sensation of the smell of a rose? Sorry, I don't understand. Please describe it.
If you dissect a mosquito to an atomic level, and model the behavior of every atom in a massive supercomputer, can you tell me what CO2 smells like to the mosquito? (or if it just behaves, like an automata, without having experience of a sensation).
| novice wrote: |
| Seeing a colour or smelling a rose stimulates neural pathways in my brain that trigger a sensation. |
Can you describe the sensation? How do you know this "sensation" even exists? Can you in theory look inside a brain, or any sort of matter really, as brains are just mater and energy obeying laws of physics, ... can you look inside and see which activities are triggering sensations and which are not, and know what those sensations are like, so as to say why this activity triggers this particular something you can't say anything meaningful about, and to say why some other activity triggers a different particular something you can't say anything meaningful about??
Here, let me make this simple. Suppose I'm a pentachromat. I have five color receptors. I have color recptors for red, green and blue, just like yours. I also have color receptors for yellow and violet. Just as none of your primary colors looks like any combination of the other two, none of my primary colors looks like any combination of the other four. So the way I see violet light, and the way I see yellow light, are entirely different from how I see any combination of red, green and blue light. My violet and yellow are something you can't imagine, and are unlike anything you experience.
Now, I ask you, using a machine which can monitor every physical thing happening in my brain, to explain why these events in my brain produce an experience like violet, and these other events produce an experience like yellow, and not vice versa. You know noting about X and Y except that they are not the same, and you're going to explain how process P1 produces X, how process P2 produces Y, and not the other way around?
| novice wrote: |
| This sensation is unique and has an internal label in my memories that enables me to recognize it as the sensation I get whenever I see yellow / smell a rose. Our language has the convention of labelling that colour sensation as yellow, which allows me to communicate with others about colours. |
Wrong. Wrong. Wrong.
Our language labels colors as if they were properties of objects or light in the external world. The color I see when looking at lemons or bananas, that I call yellow. The color you see when looking at lemons or bananas, that you call yellow. We don't know that our actual experiences are the same.
| novice wrote: |
| Can I KNOW that the sensation I get when I see yellow is the same as others get when they see yellow? No I can't, but it seems reasonable to assume that the sensations are quite similar. |
It seems reasonable to assume they're similar. Can we devise a test to check that assumption? Can we devise a test to check the very reasonable assumption that others have sensations at all?
| novice wrote: |
| Brain scans would reveal that the same parts of our brains are activated by the colour. Future technology might even enable us to communicate "telepathically", by imprinting my visual cortex's state in yours, allowing you to share the sensation I get when seeing the colour yellow. |
But if I have 5 primary colors, can you possibly explain why one process produces one color sensation, and not another, when you can't say anything about those sensations other than that they are not equal? You're seentially going to try to prove or explain why P results in X, P does not result in Y, when you know P completely, but know nothing about X and Y other than X and Y are different.
| novice wrote: |
| Like I said, our sensations and our consciousness are just emergent properties of our complex biochemistries. |
Pure conjecture? If you can't describe the sensations, what theory could explain the emergence of this sensation as opposed to that one? How do you know these emergent properties even exist? If I examine a brain, I find matter and energy obeying laws of physics. I find no "sensations" or anything that can only be explained by assuming indescribable "sensations".
Yes, I can call complex behavior of any kind as an emergent proprty, but that's altogether different. I can observe behavior. |
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novice
No harm. Pun intended!
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 8:47 pm Post subject: 954 |
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| What is your answer to these questions, Extro? |
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novice
No harm. Pun intended!
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 9:10 pm Post subject: 955 |
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Anyway, I feel like you're muddying things up, it's quite simple. Seeing the colour yellow triggers a unique neural reaction (a sensation) that the brain recognizes. The language center has associated the sensation with a language term, which is the agreed-upon designation for objects identified by individuals as yellow. It doesn't matter if each individual has a different sensation, they all identify it as yellow. Because they've learned to associate their internal sensation of yellow with the language term for yellow (when they learned their language).
And I'm not impressed by your attempts to invalidate my ability to discuss these matters based on philosophical musings of indescribability, when we are, in fact, discussing them. There's nothing in my model of how consciousness works that is dependent on what the sensation of yellow feels like to you. |
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Elethiomel
Daedalian Member
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 9:30 pm Post subject: 956 |
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I guess what he's getting at is perhaps how you can know if someone else is truly conscious, or merely behaving as if he is.
Personally I'd say that you can't know, and it's really not a meaningful distinction.
Sorry if I'm putting words in your mouth, extropalopakettle. |
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extropalopakettle
No offense, but....
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 9:47 pm Post subject: 957 |
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| novice wrote: |
| What is your answer to these questions, Extro? |
Sensations can't be described. It isn't just that I haven't found the words. I have found words - we use words - but they don't really describe. They only label. I label something X, label something Y, and tell you I have these two things which I can reliably distinguish as different, and that I can consistently label one X, and label the other Y. That's all I can tell you about them: They're different, and I've labelled one X, the other Y. So you can't possibly devise a sensible theory that explains why process P1 should produce X and process P2 should produce Y, and not vice versa. Also, in observing any two different processes P3 and P4 in a brain or anywhere else, you will be able to see how they result from matter and energy obeying the laws of physics. You won't see something happening in process P3 that makes you conclude "X is necessary to explain this", and something happening in process P4 that makes you conclude "Y is necessary to explain that". Again, knowing nothing about X and Y other than that they are different and that I've labelled them X and Y, no sensible theory could say how they would affect anything observable, let alone why this one produces one effect, and that one another. So no sensible theory can explain their emergence, and no sensible theory can use them as an explanation of things observed so that we can have evidence when they're present and when they're not.
Which brings us back to this from the previous page:
| extropalopakettle wrote: |
| BraveHat wrote: |
| There seems to be an innate understanding in science that observations are basic units of truth detection and that anything which is neither an observation nor rooted in observations is an assumption. |
Hopefully without getting bogged down in the matter. consciousness (in the sense we discussed at great length in a number of threads) is a significant example of something true (it exists) which is beyond the purview of science. This is not an "anti-science" statement, any more than it's "anti-shoe" to say shoes don't work well as gloves. But science is supposed to work for everything, some might say. Pure faith-based dogma. |
Last edited by extropalopakettle on Sun Jan 27, 2013 11:37 pm; edited 1 time in total |
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extropalopakettle
No offense, but....
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 10:17 pm Post subject: 958 |
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| novice wrote: |
| Anyway, I feel like you're muddying things up, it's quite simple. Seeing the colour yellow triggers a unique neural reaction (a sensation) that the brain recognizes. |
No, you're muddying things up, and I'm attempting to clear them up. You say "a unique neural reaction (a sensation)" as if the two were one and the same. I can observe neural reactions in brains of animals. I can observe that a mantis shrimp distinguishes12 different primary colors and their combinations, compared to our measly 3, and its color space is vastly greater than ours. Whether it even has sensations, or what they might be like, I can't observe or predict. I can certainly build machines that behave similarly that I'd have no reason to suspect have sensations like I do.
| novice wrote: |
| The language center has associated the sensation with a language term, which is the agreed-upon designation for objects identified by individuals as yellow. |
It has associated certain neural processes with a language term.
You can't have a sensible theory of how the matter in the brain associates X with one language term, Y with another, and not vice versa, when you can say nothing about X and Y.
| novice wrote: |
| It doesn't matter if each individual has a different sensation, they all identify it as yellow. |
They all identify it as yellow. A different species might be trained to do the same, as might a machine. That we can't know if they have the same sensations, or even if they have any sensations, this matters in that it tells us there is an aspect of reality that science can't detect - that science is completely blind to.
| novice wrote: |
| And I'm not impressed by your attempts to invalidate my ability to discuss these matters ... |
Quite the contrary, I do believe these matters can be discussed intelligently. This is in contrast to some who would claim if it's not subject to scientific explanation or evidence, then it's not real, or it's not something that can be intelligently reasoned about.
| novice wrote: |
| ... based on philosophical musings of indescribability, when we are, in fact, discussing them. |
I don't know what point, if any, "philosophical musings" is supposed to make, but you're "willing to stipulate" that subjective experiences can't be described. I'm willing to let you prove that wrong by describing how yellow looks to you in a way that I can know it's not the same as a 440 Hz tone sounds to me.
I can't describe color experiences, but I can determine that the fall naturally into a 3 dimensional space. That they can't be described doesn't mean they can't be intelligently discussed.
| Quote: |
| There's nothing in my model of how consciousness works that is dependent on what the sensation of yellow feels like to you. |
Nor, if it's anything like a scientific theory, is it dependent on my even having sensations. There's no objective evidence I have them. Yet I do.[/u] |
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Jedo the Jedi
Paragon in Training
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 10:26 pm Post subject: 959 |
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I'm guessing this goes beyond yellow making me happy, or is that what you mean? (I certainly feel like I need a translator for all that garbbledy-gook.) _________________ Paragon Tally: 18 mafia, 3 SKs (1 twice), 1 cultist, numerous chat scum...and counting. |
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extropalopakettle
No offense, but....
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Posted: Sun Jan 27, 2013 10:42 pm Post subject: 960 |
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| Elethiomel wrote: |
| I guess what he's getting at is perhaps how you can know if someone else is truly conscious, ... |
In the sense of feeling subjective experiences, such as we seem to be unable to describe. correct, there's no objective evidence of that.
| Elethiomel wrote: |
| ... or merely behaving as if he is. |
I'd go so far as to say "behaving as if conscious" is based on an implicit unscientific and otherwise unreasonable assumption that we have evidence or a theory explaining why consciousness (feeling of experiences) would be associated with things that behave a certain way.
If I can build a robot that "behaves as if conscious", but I can explain it's behavior without positing it has indescribable subjective experiences, and I can't see any evidence it has such, then what does "behaves as if conscious" mean?
| Elethiomel wrote: |
| Personally I'd say that you can't know, and it's really not a meaningful distinction. |
It's meaningful in a couple of ways.
One, and this is subjective, there's a sense to me in which it seems very much like existence without consciousness is like nonexistence. The universe could be as it is, with DNA based creatures on Earth gathering and processing information about the universe, developing and testing theories, compiling it all into books, all with not a single bit of awareness of anything. Having experiences seems to add another character to it. If I somehow knew that at midnight, I would cease to experience anything, but would continue to function the same as always, to me that would be no different than if I knew I would die at midnight (except that my family wouldn't know the difference).
Second, if we can't detect consciousness with anything like science - know where it is, where it isn't, and what it's like - then saying "science fails to detect anything like a universal consciousness" is much like saying "my ears didn't hear a bright flash of light". |
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